Governance Without a State?: Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood
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Columbia University Press
October, 2011
Cloth, 312 pages, 2 figures, 14 tables
ISBN: 978-0-231-15120-7
$50.00 / £34.50
Cloth, 312 pages, 2 figures, 14 tables
ISBN: 978-0-231-15120-7
$50.00 / £34.50
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Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction and Overview
Thomas Risse
In the twenty-first century, it is becoming increasingly clear that conventional modes of political steering by nation-states and international regulations are not effectively dealing with global challenges such as environmental problems, humanitarian catastrophes, and new security threats. This is one of the reasons governance has become such a central topic of research within the social sciences, focusing in particular on nonstate actors that participate in rule making and implementation. There is wide agreement that governance is supposed to achieve certain standards in the areas of rule and authority ( Herrschaft), such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, as well as to provide common goods such as security, welfare, and a clean environment.
Yet the governance discourse remains centered on an “ideal type” of modern statehood—with full internal and external sovereignty, a legitimate monopoly on the use of force, and checks and balances that constrain political rule and authority. Similarly, the “global governance” debate in international relations, while focusing on “governance without government” and the rise of private authority in world politics (e.g., Cutler et al. 1999; O’Brien et al. 2000; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Grande and Pauly 2005), is based on the assumption that functioning states are capable of implementing and enforcing global norms and rules. Even the discourse on failed, failing, and fragile states centers on state building as the main remedy for establishing or restoring political and social order (see, e.g., Rotberg 2003; Rotberg 2004; Schneckener 2004; Beisheim and Schuppert 2007).
From a global as well as a historical perspective, however, the modern nation-state is the exception rather than the rule. Outside the developed OECD world, we find areas of “limited statehood,” from developing and transition countries to failing and failed states in today’s conflict zones and—historically—in colonial societies. Areas of limited statehood lack the capacity to implement and enforce central decisions and a monopoly on the use of force. While their “international sovereignty,” that is, recognition by the international community, is still intact, they lack “domestic sovereignty,” to use Stephen Krasner’s terms (Krasner 1999).
This book starts from the assumption that “limited statehood” is not a historical accident or some deplorable deficit of most Third World and transition countries that has to be overcome by the relentless forces of economic and political modernization in an era of globalization. Rather, we suggest that “limited statehood” is here to stay—even in so-called Western and modern societies—and that governance research has to take this fundamental condition into account. The book then asks how effective and legitimate governance is possible under conditions of limited statehood and how security and other collective goods can be provided under these circumstances.
The authors of this volume investigate the governance problematic in areas of limited statehood from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, including political science, history, and law. From a theoretical perspective, the volume challenges the conventional wisdom of the governance debate as being biased toward modern developed nation-states. Moreover, if we confront the central tenets of the governance debate with the empirical reality of historical or contemporary areas of limited statehood, serious conceptual and theoretical problems arise. If one of the key concepts of modern social sciences is not applicable to two-thirds of the international community, we face not only theoretical challenges but also eminently political and practical ones.
The authors probe the following assumptions: First, governance in areas of limited statehood rests on the systematic involvement of nonstate actors and on nonhierarchical modes of political steering, including bargaining and various forms of competition (see particularly chapters by Chojnacki and Branovic, Liese and Beisheim, Börzel et al., and Enderlein et al.). Yet these modes of governance do not complement hierarchical steering by a well-functioning state but have to provide functional equivalents to developed statehood (see chapters by Schuppert and Ladwig and Rudolf). Second, governance in areas of limited statehood is “multilevel governance,” which links the local with national, regional, and global levels and is based on shared sovereignty. This is fairly obvious in colonial governance as well as in modern “protectorates” where international and transnational actors provide governance services ranging from security to public authority (see chapters by Conrad and Stange, Ladwig and Rudolf, Schneckener, and Brozus). But it is also the case in many other weak states that the international community co-governs through the provision of collective goods and services (see chapters by Liese and Beisheim, and Enderlein et al.).
This chapter begins by introducing the book’s key concepts such as limited statehood and governance. I then discuss some conceptual issues that arise when governance is applied to areas of limited statehood. Drawing on the contributions to this volume, the next section highlights the contribution of nonstate actors in the provision of governance in areas of limited statehood. The chapter concludes by pointing to the “multilevel” features of governance in areas of limited statehood, in particular the role of external actors in the provision of collective goods and services.
Conceptual Clarifications: What Is Limited Statehood?
Our concept of “limited statehood” requires clarification. In particular, it needs to be strictly distinguished from the way in which notions of “fragile,” “failing,” or “failed” statehood are used in the literature. Most typologies in the literature and datasets on fragile states, “states at risk,” and so on reveal a normative orientation toward highly developed and democratic statehood and, thus, toward the Western model (e.g., Rotberg 2003; Rotberg 2004). The benchmark is usually the democratic and capitalist state governed by the rule of law (Leibfried and Zürn 2005). This is problematic on both normative and analytical grounds. It is normatively questionable because it reveals Eurocentrism and a bias toward Western concepts as if statehood equals Western liberal statehood and market economy. We might find the political and economic systems of the People’s Republic of China and Russia morally questionable, but they certainly constitute states. Confounding statehood with a particular Western understanding is analytically problematic, too, because it tends to confuse definitional issues and research questions. If we define states as political entities that provide all kinds of services and public goods, such as security, the rule of law, welfare, and a clean environment, many, if not most, “states” in the international system do not qualify as such. Moreover, such conceptualizations of statehood, which are more than common in the literature on failing and failed states, obscure what we consider the most relevant research question: Who governs for whom, and how are governance services provided under conditions of weak statehood?
Thus, we have deliberately opted for a rather narrow concept of statehood. We follow rather closely Max Weber’s conceptualization of statehood as an institutionalized rule structure with the ability to rule authoritatively (Herrschaftsverband) and to legitimately control the means of violence (Gewaltmonopol, cf. Weber 1921/1980; on statehood in general see Benz 2001; Schuppert 2009). While no state governs hierarchically all the time, states at least possess the ability to authoritatively make, implement, and enforce central decisions for a collectivity. In other words, states command what Stephen Krasner calls “domestic sovereignty,” that is, “the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity” (1999, 4). This understanding allows us to strictly distinguish between statehood as an institutional structure of authority and the kind of governance it provides. The latter is an empirical not a definitional question—for example, control over the means of violence is part of the definition. Whether this monopoly over the use of force actually provides security for the citizens as a public good and is irrespective of one’s race, gender, or kinship becomes an empirical question. Whether a state’s polity is democratic and bound by human rights also concerns empirical issues that should not be confused with definitional ones.
If statehood is defined by the monopoly over the means of violence or the ability to make and enforce central political decisions, we can now define more precisely what “limited statehood” means. In short, while areas of limited statehood still belong to internationally recognized states (even the failed state Somalia still commands international sovereignty), it is their domestic sovereignty that is severely circumscribed. Areas of limited statehood concern those parts of a country in which central authorities (governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions or in which the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking, at least temporarily. The ability to enforce rules or to control the means of violence can be restricted along various dimensions: (1) territorial, that is, parts of a country’s territorial spaces; (2) sectoral, that is, with regard to specific policy areas; (3) social, that is, with regard to specific parts of the population; and (4) temporal. It follows that the opposite of “limited statehood” is not “unlimited” but “consolidated” statehood, that is, those areas of a country in which the state enjoys the monopoly over the means of violence and the ability to make and enforce central decisions. Thinking in terms of configurations of limited statehood also implies thinking in degrees of limited statehood rather than using the term in a dichotomous sense.
This conceptualization allows distinguishing among quite different configurations of limited statehood. As argued earlier, “limited statehood” is not confined to failing and failed states that have all but lost the ability to govern and to control their territory (Rotberg 2003; Rotberg 2004; Beisheim and Schuppert 2007; Schneckener 2004). Failed states such as Somalia comprise only a small percentage of the world’s areas of limited statehood. Most developing and transition states, for example, encompass areas of limited statehood as they only partially control the instruments of force and are only partially able to enforce decisions, mainly for reasons of insufficient political and administrative capacities. Brazil and Mexico, on the one hand, and Somalia and Sudan, on the other, constitute opposite ends of a continuum of states that contain areas of limited statehood. Moreover, and except for failed states, “limited statehood” usually does not obtain for a state as a whole but in “areas,” that is, territorial or functional spaces within otherwise functioning states in which the latter have lost their ability to govern. While the Pakistani government, for example, enjoys a monopoly over the use of force in many parts of its territory, the so-called tribal areas in the country’s northwest are beyond the control of the central government and, thus, areas of limited statehood.
It also follows that limited statehood is by no means confined to the developing world. For example, New Orleans right after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 constituted an area of limited statehood in the sense that U.S. authorities were unable to enforce decisions and to uphold the monopoly over the means of violence for a short period of time. However, this book concentrates mostly on cases in which limited statehood in an area’s territorial, sectoral, or social dimension extends over sustained periods of time. For example, the chapter by Chojnacki and Branovic on markets of violence deals empirically with territorially and socially defined areas of limited statehood in mostly sub-Saharan Africa, where the state monopoly over the use of force is systematically lacking. The chapter by Liese and Beisheim focuses on areas of limited statehood in the developing world according to their territorial, sectoral, and social dimensions. The chapter on South Africa by Börzel et al. concentrates on policy sectors in which the South African state does not have the capacity to implement and enforce its own laws.
Moreover, if we conceptualize limited statehood in such a configurative way, it becomes clear that areas of limited statehood are an almost ubiquitous phenomenon in the contemporary international system and also in historical comparison (see the chapter by Conrad and Stange). After all, the state monopoly over the means of violence has only been around for a little more than 150 years. Most contemporary states contain “areas of limited statehood” in the sense that central authorities do not control the entire territory, do not completely enjoy the monopoly over the means of violence, or have limited capacities to enforce and implement decisions, at least in some policy areas or with regard to large parts of the population. This is what Somalia, Brazil, and Indonesia but also the People’s Republic of China have in common and share with modern protectorates such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, or Bosnia-Herzegovina—internationally recognized states that lack “Westphalian sovereignty” in the sense that external actors rule parts of their territory or in some policy areas (Krasner 1999).
The following map presents a graphical description of the phenomenon. It uses a combination of two indicators of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) measuring degrees of, first, the state monopoly over the means of violence, and, second, basic administrative structures. The countries marked in white are fully consolidated states located in the Western world, as well as a handful of others, such as Chile. On the opposite end of the spectrum, we find twenty-nine failed (marked in black) or fragile (marked in dark gray) countries, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa. The remaining countries (marked in gray)—the vast majority of states in the contemporary international system—contain areas of limited statehood in the sense defined earlier. Note that about 80 percent of the world’s population lives in or exposed to such areas of limited statehood.
These data have serious consequences for the way in which we think about statehood in general. What if the modern, developed, and sovereign nation-state turns out to be a historical exception in the context of this diversity of areas of limited statehood? Even in Europe, the birthplace of modern statehood, nation-states were only able to fully establish the monopoly over the use of force in the nineteenth century (Reinhard 2007). And the globalization of sovereign statehood as the dominant feature of the contemporary international order only took place in the 1960s, as a result of decolonization.
Yet the world today, as an international community of states, is largely based on the fiction that it is populated by fully consolidated states. International law embodies the idea of sovereign nation-states, which the international community assumes are functioning states that command “effective authority” over their territories (see chapters by Schuppert and Ladwig and Rudolf). The international prohibition on intervening in the internal affairs of sovereign states assumes that these states have the full capacity to conduct their own domestic affairs. Ironically, many developing countries where limited statehood constitutes part of the daily experience of the citizens firmly insist on their full rights as sovereign states and are adamantly opposed to any intervention in their internal affairs. Moreover, international law and the legalization of world politics have increasingly embedded states in a net of legal and other binding obligations in almost every policy area (Goldstein et al. 2000; Zangl and Zürn 2004; see chapter by Ladwig and Rudolf in this volume). Yet legalization assumes that states are fully capable of implementing and enforcing the law.
Most international donor agencies and most international state-building and democratization programs—from the World Bank to the European Union and the United States—also presuppose that the modern Western nation-state is the model for “good governance” (Magen et al. 2009). Underneath these programs and strategies is the assumption of modernization theory that the modern state comes as a package consisting of an effective government, the rule of law, human rights, democracy, market economy, and some degree of social welfare. This “governance package” constitutes a world cultural script (Meyer 1987) and is applied to developing and transition countries as well as to failing and failed states. “State building” is part of this governance package that the international community tries to institute in failing or failed states (see chapters by Schneckener and Brozus). But the goal of these measures is always the same: the institutionalization of fully consolidated, democratic, Western-style nation-states.
In short, this volume challenges central assumptions of both development studies and development policies, namely, that fully consolidated statehood has to be the yardstick against which most existing states are measured. Rather, we assume that areas of limited statehood constitute much of the empirical context in most existing states, both in the contemporary international system and from a historical perspective. But this volume is not about exploring the causes of limited statehood. In fact, there are multiple causes ranging from particular colonial histories, resource constraints, failures of nation building, histories of internal warfare, and the like. Exploring these root causes would require a different book. Rather, we take areas of limited statehood as our starting point and then ask how effective and legitimate governance is possible under these circumstances.
Governance and Limited Statehood
These considerations lead to the governance problems in areas of limited statehood. In this context, this book advances a major proposition, namely, that limited statehood does not equal the absence of governance, let alone political, social, or economic order. State weakness does not simply translate to the absence of political order, rule making, or the provision of basic services. Limited statehood does not mean anarchy in a Hobbesian sense. In fact, we even find failed states such as Somalia where limited statehood is all-pervasive but where governance takes place regularly and collective goods are provided (Menkhaus 2006/2007).
Before I proceed, however, the concept of governance used in this book must be clarified. In its most general version, governance refers to all modes of coordinating social action in human society. Williamson, for example, distinguished between governance by markets and governance by hierarchy (i.e., the state); later scholars added governance by networks to this list (e.g., Williamson 1975; Rhodes 1997; Kooiman 1993). However, this understanding that identifies governance with any kind of social ordering appears to be too broad.
As a result, this book employs a somewhat narrower concept that is linked to politics. By governance, we mean in this book the various institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods. This conceptualization follows closely the understanding of governance that is widespread within the social sciences (e.g., Mayntz 2004, 2008; Kohler-Koch 1998; Benz 2004a; Schuppert 2005; Schuppert and Zürn 2008). Governance consists of both structural (“institutionalized”) and process dimensions (“modes of social coordination”). Accordingly, governance covers steering by the state (“governance by government”), governance via cooperative networks of public and private actors (“governance with government”), as well as rule making by nonstate actors or self-regulation by civil society (“governance without government;” cf. Benz 2004a; Czempiel and Rosenau 1992; Grande and Pauly 2005; Zürn 1998). Governance is supposed to provide collectively binding rules as well as collective goods.
The modern (Western) nation-state, thus, constitutes a governance structure. First, it provides a structure of rule and authority, a system of political and social institutions to generate and to implement authoritative political decisions. Today, democracy and the rule of law belong to the generally accepted norms of these institutions for authoritative rule making. Second, the Western nation-state has the task to protect the internal and external security of its citizens. The monopoly over the means of violence is supposed to do just that. Finally, the rendering of public services is part of the classical responsibilities of the state, from the creation of economic stability and the guarantee of minimal social security to public health, education, and, today, the maintenance and the creation of a clean environment. In short, the modern Western nation-state provides governance in the areas of rule making and enforcement, on the one hand, and collective goods such as security, welfare, and a clean environment, on the other. While this nation-state is undergoing a profound transformation (Leibfried and Zürn 2005; Hurrelmann et al. 2007), its ability to ultimately make, implement, and enforce decisions is beyond doubt, even if the modern state privatizes or deregulates previously public services. In other words, the modern state’s “shadow of hierarchy” is never in doubt, even in the age of profound (neoliberal) privatization and deregulation (Börzel 2008).
This changes profoundly under conditions of limited statehood. Governance in areas of limited statehood requires providing these very governance services in the absence of a fully functioning state’s exerting at least a “shadow of hierarchy” with the ability to enforce and implement decisions. This implies that we will have to look for functional equivalents to modern statehood (see Draude 2007 on this point)—unless we want to give up the normative proposition that human beings have a right to a decent authority structure, security, and other collective goods (for a discussion of these normative problems, see Ladwig 2007; see also chapter by Ladwig and Rudolf in this volume).
This book explores the various forms of governance emerging in the context of limited statehood. We assume that forms of governance emerge under these conditions. The contemporary social science literature discusses these as “new” modes of governance or the privatization of authority (e.g., Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999; Grande and Pauly 2005; Hall and Biersteker 2002). However, as the chapter by Conrad and Stange demonstrates, these “new” modes of governance are by no means specific to the contemporary international system. The colonial state, for example, constituted an area of limited statehood as we understand it in this volume, as a result of which governance took place through colonial rulers (“states”), transnational “public-private” companies (e.g., the Hudson Bay Company in North America or the East India Company in Asia), and local “private” actors such as settlers.
Governance as a process entails two dimensions: actors and modes of coordinating social action. Various combinations of state and nonstate actors “govern” in areas of limited statehood. These can be public-private partnerships (see Schäferhoff et al. 2009, also chapter by Liese and Beisheim in this volume) in which national governments, international (interstate) organizations, as well as (multinational) firms and (international) nongovernmental organizations co-govern. But governance can also be provided by the self-regulation of firms (chapter by Börzel et al. in this volume) and even by warlords and other violent actors (see chapter by Chojnacki and Branovic in this volume). The second part of this book explores the various contributions of nonstate actors to governance in areas of limited statehood.
The second process dimension of governance concerns modes of steering. The modern (Western) nation-state has the ability of hierarchical steering, that is, authoritatively enforcing the law, ultimately through policing and “top-down” command and control. It is precisely this ability to enforce decisions that is lacking in areas of limited statehood. To the extent that hierarchical steering and authoritative rule do take place in areas of limited statehood, we have to look for actors other than the national governments. As Chojnacki and Branovic point out in their chapter, warlords and local “big men” sometimes exert hierarchical control in war-torn areas of limited statehood. In addition, international organizations as well as—mostly Western—states often interfere authoritatively, particularly in modern protectorates such as Kosovo or Afghanistan that have all but lost their “Westphalian sovereignty” (see chapters by Schneckener and Brozus in this volume).
Much more common, however, are nonhierarchical modes of social coordination in areas of limited statehood (Börzel and Risse 2005; Göhler et al. 2009). Nonhierarchical steering involves creating and manipulating incentives and “benchmarking,” as well as initiating communicative learning processes. Positive incentives as well as sanctions are meant to affect the cost-benefit calculations of the relevant parties and to induce the desired behavior. Governance also includes bargaining processes and horizontal negotiation as well as nonmanipulative communication, persuasion, and learning. The latter modes of governance aim at challenging fixed interests and preferences so that actors are induced in a socialization process to internalize new rules and norms. Most chapters in the second part of this book explore the bargaining processes between state and nonstate actors involved in governance in areas of limited statehood.
When Governance Travels: The Implicit (Western) Bias of Social Science Concepts
The understanding of governance employed in this book largely follows the conceptualizations in American and European social sciences. However, applying the governance concept to areas of limited statehood reveals some implicit biases. The way in which the governance concept has been developed in the social sciences (and has become part of political practice) is strongly influenced by the experiences of Western modernity and of modern statehood as defined earlier.
The Distinction Between the “Public” and the “Private” Spheres
Defining governance and the modes of governance in terms of including state and nonstate actors in the provision of collective goods more often than not relies on the distinction between the “public” and “private” realms. This distinction, however, stems from modern statehood in its Western and Eurocentric understandings. This is problematic when we apply the governance concept to other historical contexts or other cultural experiences in the contemporary international system. Historically speaking, the modern Western notion of the “private sphere” is connected to processes of individualization and personalization that only emerged in the second half of eighteenth-century Europe leading to the separation of the public and the private (e.g., Böckenförde 1976; Keane 1988). As Conrad and Stange argue in their chapter, thinking of the “public” and the “private” spheres as binary categories is inherently problematic with regard to colonial rule. They demonstrate, for example, that the differences between state-funded administrative personnel and “private” actors among the colonizers were marginal at best—for example, the “private” East India Company exercised “public” authority on behalf of the British Empire. The same holds true for the definition of indigenous elites as “private” actors, since colonizers often gave local “chiefs” the authority to rule hierarchically.
Applying the public-private distinction to contemporary areas of limited statehood is just as difficult. Of course, we can still distinguish formally between the state and the nonstate sector including for-profit companies, on the one hand, and the nonprofit and civil society sector, on the other. But what does this mean in countries in which state institutions are so weak that government actors can easily exploit state resources for private purposes, while so-called “private” actors such as companies or NGOs provide much-needed collective goods with regard to education, public health, or infrastructure (e.g., Börzel et al. 2007; Fuhr et al. 2007; see chapters by Liese and Beisheim, and Börzel et al. in this volume). In other words, the implicit assumption of the public-private distinction according to which governments govern and private actors mind their own business is often turned on its head in areas of limited statehood. The distinction that comes with Western modernity, according to which “state = public” and “nonstate = private” is enormously problematic in areas of limited statehood.
Take the example of Palestine under Yasser Arafat: The Palestinian Authority was more or less corrupt at the time and the development aid provided by the international community to jump-start the Palestinian state ended up in private coffers. At the same time, the militant Islamist organization of Hamas provided crucial governance services in the social, education, and public health sectors of the Palestinian territories. So, who governed Palestine at the time? If we use the previously stated governance definition, Hamas is Janus-faced: On the one hand, it is a governance actor providing public services in Palestine. On the other hand and almost at the same time, it is a terrorist organization that undermines governance in the security realm. The same held true for the Palestinian Authority under Arafat: Its security agencies at least tried to maintain public security in the occupied territories, while Palestinian “state” actors undermined governance with regard to the provision of other collective goods/
The example of Palestine refers to widespread phenomena in areas of limited statehood: Rent-seeking governments distribute state revenues including development aid to maintain their rule via clientelistic networks (the so-called neopatrimonial state in sub-Saharan Africa, the Southern Caucasus, and elsewhere; see Erdmann 2002; Erdmann and Engel 2007). In other words, they transform public goods into club or even private goods. In a different way, the emergence of “shadow states” has to be considered here too (Koehler and Zürcher 2004; Zürcher 2007). On the one hand, formal state institutions have ceased to exist or to provide governance services in failing and failed states. On the other hand, informal governance institutions often emerge providing social and political order as well as collective goods, thereby preventing the country or the region from completely collapsing into anarchy. In some cases, such as the Southern Caucasus, shadow states survive over extended periods of time.
These examples challenge the way in which the concepts of “state” and “public” as well as “nonstate” and “private” are mostly used interchangeably in the social sciences based on the historical experience of Western modernity. They also show the implicit normative connotations of the distinction (see Ladwig et al. 2007; also chapter by Ladwig and Rudolf in this volume). We usually expect that state actors contribute to governance, that is, that they act in the public rather than the private interest. At least, they are supposed to justify their actions with regard to the common good (see Zürn 2005). While policy-makers might be power-seeking, state institutions in a consolidated state—no matter how “transformed”—are supposed to direct their practices toward governance in the common interest. And if they abuse their power, we can throw them out through democratic procedures or, in the worst case, through the judicial system. Limited statehood, however, consists of weak political institutions lacking the capacity to constrain power-maximizing actors. As a result, it becomes problematic to speak of “public” actors in such cases or to assume that state actors promote the public interest. As to private actors, we usually assume that private companies pursue their egoistic self-interest, even if their businesses practices produce positive externalities for the community (jobs, welfare, etc.). But we also assume that private actors act within the confines of the law—and if not, that the courts will take care of them.
These assumptions that come with the “public-private” distinction are missing in areas of limited statehood. At least, they can no longer be taken for granted. The conceptual problem cannot be solved easily—for example, one could speak of “hybrid” regimes or forms of governance in order to avoid the distinction between the public and private realms or between state and nonstate actors (e.g., Bendel et al. 2002). But such a solution only sidesteps the problem to discern who provides governance services and who does not, and under which conditions. A possible way out would be to investigate empirically who serves as a governance actor—irrespective of a formal position in the political system or in society. In other words, one would search for functional equivalents of “public” actors (Draude 2007, 2008).
Intentionality and Normativity of Governance
These considerations lead to a second problem with regard to the applicability of the governance concept to areas of limited statehood. The governance concept as defined earlier is geared toward producing and implementing collectively binding rules and providing collective goods. In other words, governance implies intentional action toward providing public services for a given community (Mayntz 2004, 67). This does not mean that governance actors have to be necessarily motivated toward the public interest, even though motivations toward the common interest do not hurt. Policy-makers, for example, can still be egoistic power-maximizers. Yet, in a consolidated state, they are usually embedded in governance structures that institutionalize the intentionality of governance toward providing services for the community.
The inherent intentionality of governance becomes problematic when applied to areas of limited statehood. First, as noted earlier, we can no longer assume that governance institutions such as the state or its “shadow of hierarchy” embody intentions toward providing collective goods. Second, we need to distinguish between the provision of some collective goods or services as the unintended consequence of “private” activities, on the one hand, and the explicit regulation of social issues and intentional provision of collective goods, on the other. Only the second understanding would qualify as governance if we stick to the earlier conceptualization.
To illustrate the point with an example: Oil companies such as BP in Angola routinely use private security firms to protect their industrial production facilities in areas of limited statehood. This transforms security into a private good. Protecting such facilities might have positive externalities for the surrounding neighborhoods insofar as the security firms might unintentionally deter armed gangs or militias from attacking nearby villages too. In this sense, the firms while primarily providing a private good for BP would also contribute to public security, albeit indirectly. But we would not call this security governance because of the lack of intentionality. This activity could be called governance only if BP explicitly instructs the security firm to protect not only the oil facilities but also the surrounding villages.
In other cases, we are faced with a continuum ranging from governance in the sense defined here to “racketeering:” The Afghan warlord who uses his militias to provide public security for the area of his rule can be regarded a governance actor. However, the more he uses the same militias to threaten the safety of the community and then resells security to clientelistic networks for a protection fee, the more he would transform public security into a club or private good. The latter would be “racketeering” (Chojnacki and Branovic 2007; Schuppert 2007, 479; see the chapter by Chojnacki and Branovic in this volume).
Thus, applying the governance concept to areas of limited statehood highlights its unavoidable intentionality and implicit normativity. If we define governance—as is common in the social sciences—as the making and implementing of collectively binding rules and the provision of collective goods, we cannot refrain from acknowledging that governance is linked normatively toward what is supposed to be in the common interest. But who are those in areas of limited statehood in whose name the “common interest” is being pronounced? What is the relevant community or collectivity for whom governance is provided? Once again, these issues are clearly decided in the ideal typical modern Western state. In most cases, governance is provided for the people or the citizens living in a given territory. While some services are only accessible to the citizens rather than the residents, even noncitizen residents enjoy some basic rights as well as access to at least some public services.
All this becomes problematic in areas of limited statehood. In many cases, it remains unclear who are the addressees of governance, who is entitled to which governance services, and who actually receives them in practice. We cannot simply assume that the collectivity for which governance is provided is clearly defined. Take border regions in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, that are beyond the control of central governments. Are those entitled to receiving governance the people living on a given territory? Or members of particular tribal or ethnic communities? And who decides who is entitled to what, particularly in cases of extremely scarce resources? Is it governance if collective goods become club goods in the sense that only particular ethnic, religious, or gendered communities are entitled to receive them? The latter constitutes a common practice in many areas of limited statehood, both historically and in the contemporary international system.
Thus, applying governance to areas of limited statehood requires taking a step back and refraining from “either everything or nothing” conceptual solutions. On the one hand, if governance is overburdened with such a strong normative orientation toward the common good or the public interest, we will not find much governance in areas of limited statehood by definition (on this point, see Schuppert 2007). In this case, governance does not travel very far outside the developed OECD world. On the other hand, if we strip the concept of governance of all normative connotations, then everything is governance and the privatization of collective goods has normative weight equal to the provision of public goods.
I suggest something in between as a way out: we should consider governance as both a process and a continuum. The more inclusive the social group for which goods are provided or regulations are formulated, the more we should consider this as governance. After all, this approximates the definition of public goods in terms of nonrivalry in consumption and nonexclusivity in access. In contrast, the more certain services are only provided for exclusive groups and the more collective goods are transformed into club or private goods accessible only to those who pay for them or who belong to specific ethnic or religious groups, the less we should conceptualize this as governance. In particular, applying the notion of collective goods to areas of limited statehood requires a more differentiated conceptualization of the collectivity for which governance is provided. In many cases, those entitled to receiving collective goods such as security are distinct from the addressees of governance services that also differ from those who factually receive governance (see the chapter by Chojnacki and Branovic in this volume; also De la Rosa et al. 2008).
It follows that the borders between governance and “racketeering” are rather fluid in areas of limited statehood. The weaker and the more fragile the state, the less it makes sense to judge governance services according to benchmarks derived from modern developed states. Rather, we should strive for minimum normative standards in these cases (Keohane 2007; Ladwig 2007; also the chapter by Ladwig and Rudolf in this volume).
Governance and the “Shadow of Hierarchy”
A third problem with regard to the application of the governance concept to areas of limited statehood concerns what has been called the “shadow of hierarchy” (Scharpf 1993). Research on modes of governance in the OECD world and on the transformation of (modern) statehood has demonstrated that public-private cooperation (such as PPPs) and private self-regulation are usually most effective under the “shadow of hierarchy.” This means that state agencies supervise private regulatory efforts and that governments threaten to legislate if private actors do not get their act together or do not provide the collective goods. The liberalization of various public services—such as telecommunications, electricity, and the like—has led to ample efforts at reregulation by the modern state (e.g., Héritier 2003; Börzel 2007; 2008). Hierarchical steering or the threat to do so appears to be a precondition for the successful implementation and effectiveness of modes of governance in the modern nation-state and beyond. In other words, nonhierarchical modes of steering and including nonstate actors in governance complement rather than substitute for regulatory activities by national governments or supranational institutions such as the European Union. Moreover—and paradoxically—strong states or strong supranational organizations are required for nonhierarchical modes of steering to be effective and to enhance the problem-solving capacity of governance (Börzel 2009, 2010). Managing political authority requires effective state capacities including a strong “shadow of hierarchy.”
If these findings are universally applicable, then governance in areas of limited statehood is doomed. Areas of limited statehood are by definition characterized by weak state capacities to implement and enforce decisions, that is, by weak “shadows of hierarchy.” Moreover, the contribution of nonstate actors to the provision of collective goods has to substitute for governance by governments rather than to complement it. If the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) decides to withdraw from providing services in the area of public health—for example, the immunization of children—in sub-Saharan Africa, these services will not be provided at all (for details see Schäferhoff, in preparation; Beisheim et al. 2008; and the chapter by Liese and Beisheim in this volume). If Daimler and other automobile manufacturers in South Africa were to withdraw from fighting HIV/AIDS at their production facilities and the surrounding areas, the fight there against the pandemic would be doomed (Börzel, Héritier, and Müller-Debus 2007; Müller-Debus et al. 2009). The same holds true for environmental protection in South Africa, as the chapter by Börzel et al. reveals. In each of these examples, the central governments are far too weak to provide the collective goods in question. As a result, private actors and the international community substitute for rather than complement governance by the state.
What explains then that we actually find governance in areas of limited statehood? The chapters in this volume suggest that there might be functional equivalents to the “shadow of hierarchy” provided by consolidated statehood (see Börzel 2010). First, in the case of the modern protectorates, the international community not only rules authoritatively in areas of limited statehood and interferes with a country’s “Westphalian sovereignty,” but it also provides a “shadow of hierarchy” (chapters by Schneckener and Brozus in this volume; see also Lake 2009 on hierarchy in the international order). Second, international legal standards on good governance, human rights, and the rule of law hold actors accountable in areas of limited statehood, be it governments, NGOs, firms, or even rebel groups (see chapter by Ladwig and Rudolf in this volume). While enforcement of these standards is inherently problematic, the increased legalization of these standards including the international “responsibility to protect” (R2P) casts a shadow of hierarchy in areas of limited statehood. Last but not least, there are various incentive structures available to commit nonstate actors to the provision of collective goods even under the most dire circumstances of limited statehood. As Chojnacki and Branovic argue in their chapter, even warlords, local “big men,” or rebel groups sometimes provide security as a collective good in security markets if faced with an opportunity structure by which they benefit from protecting the local population rather than exploiting it. As to firms and environmental protection in South Africa, Börzel et al. show that there are several market-based mechanisms inducing companies to engage in self-regulation. If, for example, brand-name firms target high-end markets or are subjected to NGO campaigns, they are likely to provide collective goods in the framework of corporate social responsibility (CSR).
In sum, this overview suggests that there are some implicit biases in the governance concept as it has been developed in the context of Western-based social sciences and modern statehood. However, one should not throw out the baby with the bathwater. The governance concept provides a useful tool to analyze policies and politics in areas of limited statehood, precisely because it directs our attention to the role of nonstate actors, on the one hand, and nonhierarchical modes of steering, on the other. As a result, governance overcomes the state-centric bias implicit in the literature on failed and failing states as well as the modernization bias of most development studies. State-building in areas of limited statehood might be futile, but “governance-shaping” certainly is not, as Brozus argues in his chapter.
I now turn to the contributions in this book in more detail to explore the role of nonstate actors in the provision of governance, on the one hand, and the contribution of the international community to governance in areas of limited statehood, on the other.
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Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction and Overview
Thomas Risse
In the twenty-first century, it is becoming increasingly clear that conventional modes of political steering by nation-states and international regulations are not effectively dealing with global challenges such as environmental problems, humanitarian catastrophes, and new security threats. This is one of the reasons governance has become such a central topic of research within the social sciences, focusing in particular on nonstate actors that participate in rule making and implementation. There is wide agreement that governance is supposed to achieve certain standards in the areas of rule and authority ( Herrschaft), such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, as well as to provide common goods such as security, welfare, and a clean environment.
Yet the governance discourse remains centered on an “ideal type” of modern statehood—with full internal and external sovereignty, a legitimate monopoly on the use of force, and checks and balances that constrain political rule and authority. Similarly, the “global governance” debate in international relations, while focusing on “governance without government” and the rise of private authority in world politics (e.g., Cutler et al. 1999; O’Brien et al. 2000; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Grande and Pauly 2005), is based on the assumption that functioning states are capable of implementing and enforcing global norms and rules. Even the discourse on failed, failing, and fragile states centers on state building as the main remedy for establishing or restoring political and social order (see, e.g., Rotberg 2003; Rotberg 2004; Schneckener 2004; Beisheim and Schuppert 2007).
From a global as well as a historical perspective, however, the modern nation-state is the exception rather than the rule. Outside the developed OECD world, we find areas of “limited statehood,” from developing and transition countries to failing and failed states in today’s conflict zones and—historically—in colonial societies. Areas of limited statehood lack the capacity to implement and enforce central decisions and a monopoly on the use of force. While their “international sovereignty,” that is, recognition by the international community, is still intact, they lack “domestic sovereignty,” to use Stephen Krasner’s terms (Krasner 1999).
This book starts from the assumption that “limited statehood” is not a historical accident or some deplorable deficit of most Third World and transition countries that has to be overcome by the relentless forces of economic and political modernization in an era of globalization. Rather, we suggest that “limited statehood” is here to stay—even in so-called Western and modern societies—and that governance research has to take this fundamental condition into account. The book then asks how effective and legitimate governance is possible under conditions of limited statehood and how security and other collective goods can be provided under these circumstances.
The authors of this volume investigate the governance problematic in areas of limited statehood from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, including political science, history, and law. From a theoretical perspective, the volume challenges the conventional wisdom of the governance debate as being biased toward modern developed nation-states. Moreover, if we confront the central tenets of the governance debate with the empirical reality of historical or contemporary areas of limited statehood, serious conceptual and theoretical problems arise. If one of the key concepts of modern social sciences is not applicable to two-thirds of the international community, we face not only theoretical challenges but also eminently political and practical ones.
The authors probe the following assumptions: First, governance in areas of limited statehood rests on the systematic involvement of nonstate actors and on nonhierarchical modes of political steering, including bargaining and various forms of competition (see particularly chapters by Chojnacki and Branovic, Liese and Beisheim, Börzel et al., and Enderlein et al.). Yet these modes of governance do not complement hierarchical steering by a well-functioning state but have to provide functional equivalents to developed statehood (see chapters by Schuppert and Ladwig and Rudolf). Second, governance in areas of limited statehood is “multilevel governance,” which links the local with national, regional, and global levels and is based on shared sovereignty. This is fairly obvious in colonial governance as well as in modern “protectorates” where international and transnational actors provide governance services ranging from security to public authority (see chapters by Conrad and Stange, Ladwig and Rudolf, Schneckener, and Brozus). But it is also the case in many other weak states that the international community co-governs through the provision of collective goods and services (see chapters by Liese and Beisheim, and Enderlein et al.).
This chapter begins by introducing the book’s key concepts such as limited statehood and governance. I then discuss some conceptual issues that arise when governance is applied to areas of limited statehood. Drawing on the contributions to this volume, the next section highlights the contribution of nonstate actors in the provision of governance in areas of limited statehood. The chapter concludes by pointing to the “multilevel” features of governance in areas of limited statehood, in particular the role of external actors in the provision of collective goods and services.
Conceptual Clarifications: What Is Limited Statehood?
Our concept of “limited statehood” requires clarification. In particular, it needs to be strictly distinguished from the way in which notions of “fragile,” “failing,” or “failed” statehood are used in the literature. Most typologies in the literature and datasets on fragile states, “states at risk,” and so on reveal a normative orientation toward highly developed and democratic statehood and, thus, toward the Western model (e.g., Rotberg 2003; Rotberg 2004). The benchmark is usually the democratic and capitalist state governed by the rule of law (Leibfried and Zürn 2005). This is problematic on both normative and analytical grounds. It is normatively questionable because it reveals Eurocentrism and a bias toward Western concepts as if statehood equals Western liberal statehood and market economy. We might find the political and economic systems of the People’s Republic of China and Russia morally questionable, but they certainly constitute states. Confounding statehood with a particular Western understanding is analytically problematic, too, because it tends to confuse definitional issues and research questions. If we define states as political entities that provide all kinds of services and public goods, such as security, the rule of law, welfare, and a clean environment, many, if not most, “states” in the international system do not qualify as such. Moreover, such conceptualizations of statehood, which are more than common in the literature on failing and failed states, obscure what we consider the most relevant research question: Who governs for whom, and how are governance services provided under conditions of weak statehood?
Thus, we have deliberately opted for a rather narrow concept of statehood. We follow rather closely Max Weber’s conceptualization of statehood as an institutionalized rule structure with the ability to rule authoritatively (Herrschaftsverband) and to legitimately control the means of violence (Gewaltmonopol, cf. Weber 1921/1980; on statehood in general see Benz 2001; Schuppert 2009). While no state governs hierarchically all the time, states at least possess the ability to authoritatively make, implement, and enforce central decisions for a collectivity. In other words, states command what Stephen Krasner calls “domestic sovereignty,” that is, “the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity” (1999, 4). This understanding allows us to strictly distinguish between statehood as an institutional structure of authority and the kind of governance it provides. The latter is an empirical not a definitional question—for example, control over the means of violence is part of the definition. Whether this monopoly over the use of force actually provides security for the citizens as a public good and is irrespective of one’s race, gender, or kinship becomes an empirical question. Whether a state’s polity is democratic and bound by human rights also concerns empirical issues that should not be confused with definitional ones.
If statehood is defined by the monopoly over the means of violence or the ability to make and enforce central political decisions, we can now define more precisely what “limited statehood” means. In short, while areas of limited statehood still belong to internationally recognized states (even the failed state Somalia still commands international sovereignty), it is their domestic sovereignty that is severely circumscribed. Areas of limited statehood concern those parts of a country in which central authorities (governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions or in which the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking, at least temporarily. The ability to enforce rules or to control the means of violence can be restricted along various dimensions: (1) territorial, that is, parts of a country’s territorial spaces; (2) sectoral, that is, with regard to specific policy areas; (3) social, that is, with regard to specific parts of the population; and (4) temporal. It follows that the opposite of “limited statehood” is not “unlimited” but “consolidated” statehood, that is, those areas of a country in which the state enjoys the monopoly over the means of violence and the ability to make and enforce central decisions. Thinking in terms of configurations of limited statehood also implies thinking in degrees of limited statehood rather than using the term in a dichotomous sense.
This conceptualization allows distinguishing among quite different configurations of limited statehood. As argued earlier, “limited statehood” is not confined to failing and failed states that have all but lost the ability to govern and to control their territory (Rotberg 2003; Rotberg 2004; Beisheim and Schuppert 2007; Schneckener 2004). Failed states such as Somalia comprise only a small percentage of the world’s areas of limited statehood. Most developing and transition states, for example, encompass areas of limited statehood as they only partially control the instruments of force and are only partially able to enforce decisions, mainly for reasons of insufficient political and administrative capacities. Brazil and Mexico, on the one hand, and Somalia and Sudan, on the other, constitute opposite ends of a continuum of states that contain areas of limited statehood. Moreover, and except for failed states, “limited statehood” usually does not obtain for a state as a whole but in “areas,” that is, territorial or functional spaces within otherwise functioning states in which the latter have lost their ability to govern. While the Pakistani government, for example, enjoys a monopoly over the use of force in many parts of its territory, the so-called tribal areas in the country’s northwest are beyond the control of the central government and, thus, areas of limited statehood.
It also follows that limited statehood is by no means confined to the developing world. For example, New Orleans right after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 constituted an area of limited statehood in the sense that U.S. authorities were unable to enforce decisions and to uphold the monopoly over the means of violence for a short period of time. However, this book concentrates mostly on cases in which limited statehood in an area’s territorial, sectoral, or social dimension extends over sustained periods of time. For example, the chapter by Chojnacki and Branovic on markets of violence deals empirically with territorially and socially defined areas of limited statehood in mostly sub-Saharan Africa, where the state monopoly over the use of force is systematically lacking. The chapter by Liese and Beisheim focuses on areas of limited statehood in the developing world according to their territorial, sectoral, and social dimensions. The chapter on South Africa by Börzel et al. concentrates on policy sectors in which the South African state does not have the capacity to implement and enforce its own laws.
Moreover, if we conceptualize limited statehood in such a configurative way, it becomes clear that areas of limited statehood are an almost ubiquitous phenomenon in the contemporary international system and also in historical comparison (see the chapter by Conrad and Stange). After all, the state monopoly over the means of violence has only been around for a little more than 150 years. Most contemporary states contain “areas of limited statehood” in the sense that central authorities do not control the entire territory, do not completely enjoy the monopoly over the means of violence, or have limited capacities to enforce and implement decisions, at least in some policy areas or with regard to large parts of the population. This is what Somalia, Brazil, and Indonesia but also the People’s Republic of China have in common and share with modern protectorates such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, or Bosnia-Herzegovina—internationally recognized states that lack “Westphalian sovereignty” in the sense that external actors rule parts of their territory or in some policy areas (Krasner 1999).
The following map presents a graphical description of the phenomenon. It uses a combination of two indicators of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) measuring degrees of, first, the state monopoly over the means of violence, and, second, basic administrative structures. The countries marked in white are fully consolidated states located in the Western world, as well as a handful of others, such as Chile. On the opposite end of the spectrum, we find twenty-nine failed (marked in black) or fragile (marked in dark gray) countries, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa. The remaining countries (marked in gray)—the vast majority of states in the contemporary international system—contain areas of limited statehood in the sense defined earlier. Note that about 80 percent of the world’s population lives in or exposed to such areas of limited statehood.
These data have serious consequences for the way in which we think about statehood in general. What if the modern, developed, and sovereign nation-state turns out to be a historical exception in the context of this diversity of areas of limited statehood? Even in Europe, the birthplace of modern statehood, nation-states were only able to fully establish the monopoly over the use of force in the nineteenth century (Reinhard 2007). And the globalization of sovereign statehood as the dominant feature of the contemporary international order only took place in the 1960s, as a result of decolonization.
Yet the world today, as an international community of states, is largely based on the fiction that it is populated by fully consolidated states. International law embodies the idea of sovereign nation-states, which the international community assumes are functioning states that command “effective authority” over their territories (see chapters by Schuppert and Ladwig and Rudolf). The international prohibition on intervening in the internal affairs of sovereign states assumes that these states have the full capacity to conduct their own domestic affairs. Ironically, many developing countries where limited statehood constitutes part of the daily experience of the citizens firmly insist on their full rights as sovereign states and are adamantly opposed to any intervention in their internal affairs. Moreover, international law and the legalization of world politics have increasingly embedded states in a net of legal and other binding obligations in almost every policy area (Goldstein et al. 2000; Zangl and Zürn 2004; see chapter by Ladwig and Rudolf in this volume). Yet legalization assumes that states are fully capable of implementing and enforcing the law.
Most international donor agencies and most international state-building and democratization programs—from the World Bank to the European Union and the United States—also presuppose that the modern Western nation-state is the model for “good governance” (Magen et al. 2009). Underneath these programs and strategies is the assumption of modernization theory that the modern state comes as a package consisting of an effective government, the rule of law, human rights, democracy, market economy, and some degree of social welfare. This “governance package” constitutes a world cultural script (Meyer 1987) and is applied to developing and transition countries as well as to failing and failed states. “State building” is part of this governance package that the international community tries to institute in failing or failed states (see chapters by Schneckener and Brozus). But the goal of these measures is always the same: the institutionalization of fully consolidated, democratic, Western-style nation-states.
In short, this volume challenges central assumptions of both development studies and development policies, namely, that fully consolidated statehood has to be the yardstick against which most existing states are measured. Rather, we assume that areas of limited statehood constitute much of the empirical context in most existing states, both in the contemporary international system and from a historical perspective. But this volume is not about exploring the causes of limited statehood. In fact, there are multiple causes ranging from particular colonial histories, resource constraints, failures of nation building, histories of internal warfare, and the like. Exploring these root causes would require a different book. Rather, we take areas of limited statehood as our starting point and then ask how effective and legitimate governance is possible under these circumstances.
Governance and Limited Statehood
These considerations lead to the governance problems in areas of limited statehood. In this context, this book advances a major proposition, namely, that limited statehood does not equal the absence of governance, let alone political, social, or economic order. State weakness does not simply translate to the absence of political order, rule making, or the provision of basic services. Limited statehood does not mean anarchy in a Hobbesian sense. In fact, we even find failed states such as Somalia where limited statehood is all-pervasive but where governance takes place regularly and collective goods are provided (Menkhaus 2006/2007).
Before I proceed, however, the concept of governance used in this book must be clarified. In its most general version, governance refers to all modes of coordinating social action in human society. Williamson, for example, distinguished between governance by markets and governance by hierarchy (i.e., the state); later scholars added governance by networks to this list (e.g., Williamson 1975; Rhodes 1997; Kooiman 1993). However, this understanding that identifies governance with any kind of social ordering appears to be too broad.
As a result, this book employs a somewhat narrower concept that is linked to politics. By governance, we mean in this book the various institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods. This conceptualization follows closely the understanding of governance that is widespread within the social sciences (e.g., Mayntz 2004, 2008; Kohler-Koch 1998; Benz 2004a; Schuppert 2005; Schuppert and Zürn 2008). Governance consists of both structural (“institutionalized”) and process dimensions (“modes of social coordination”). Accordingly, governance covers steering by the state (“governance by government”), governance via cooperative networks of public and private actors (“governance with government”), as well as rule making by nonstate actors or self-regulation by civil society (“governance without government;” cf. Benz 2004a; Czempiel and Rosenau 1992; Grande and Pauly 2005; Zürn 1998). Governance is supposed to provide collectively binding rules as well as collective goods.
The modern (Western) nation-state, thus, constitutes a governance structure. First, it provides a structure of rule and authority, a system of political and social institutions to generate and to implement authoritative political decisions. Today, democracy and the rule of law belong to the generally accepted norms of these institutions for authoritative rule making. Second, the Western nation-state has the task to protect the internal and external security of its citizens. The monopoly over the means of violence is supposed to do just that. Finally, the rendering of public services is part of the classical responsibilities of the state, from the creation of economic stability and the guarantee of minimal social security to public health, education, and, today, the maintenance and the creation of a clean environment. In short, the modern Western nation-state provides governance in the areas of rule making and enforcement, on the one hand, and collective goods such as security, welfare, and a clean environment, on the other. While this nation-state is undergoing a profound transformation (Leibfried and Zürn 2005; Hurrelmann et al. 2007), its ability to ultimately make, implement, and enforce decisions is beyond doubt, even if the modern state privatizes or deregulates previously public services. In other words, the modern state’s “shadow of hierarchy” is never in doubt, even in the age of profound (neoliberal) privatization and deregulation (Börzel 2008).
This changes profoundly under conditions of limited statehood. Governance in areas of limited statehood requires providing these very governance services in the absence of a fully functioning state’s exerting at least a “shadow of hierarchy” with the ability to enforce and implement decisions. This implies that we will have to look for functional equivalents to modern statehood (see Draude 2007 on this point)—unless we want to give up the normative proposition that human beings have a right to a decent authority structure, security, and other collective goods (for a discussion of these normative problems, see Ladwig 2007; see also chapter by Ladwig and Rudolf in this volume).
This book explores the various forms of governance emerging in the context of limited statehood. We assume that forms of governance emerge under these conditions. The contemporary social science literature discusses these as “new” modes of governance or the privatization of authority (e.g., Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999; Grande and Pauly 2005; Hall and Biersteker 2002). However, as the chapter by Conrad and Stange demonstrates, these “new” modes of governance are by no means specific to the contemporary international system. The colonial state, for example, constituted an area of limited statehood as we understand it in this volume, as a result of which governance took place through colonial rulers (“states”), transnational “public-private” companies (e.g., the Hudson Bay Company in North America or the East India Company in Asia), and local “private” actors such as settlers.
Governance as a process entails two dimensions: actors and modes of coordinating social action. Various combinations of state and nonstate actors “govern” in areas of limited statehood. These can be public-private partnerships (see Schäferhoff et al. 2009, also chapter by Liese and Beisheim in this volume) in which national governments, international (interstate) organizations, as well as (multinational) firms and (international) nongovernmental organizations co-govern. But governance can also be provided by the self-regulation of firms (chapter by Börzel et al. in this volume) and even by warlords and other violent actors (see chapter by Chojnacki and Branovic in this volume). The second part of this book explores the various contributions of nonstate actors to governance in areas of limited statehood.
The second process dimension of governance concerns modes of steering. The modern (Western) nation-state has the ability of hierarchical steering, that is, authoritatively enforcing the law, ultimately through policing and “top-down” command and control. It is precisely this ability to enforce decisions that is lacking in areas of limited statehood. To the extent that hierarchical steering and authoritative rule do take place in areas of limited statehood, we have to look for actors other than the national governments. As Chojnacki and Branovic point out in their chapter, warlords and local “big men” sometimes exert hierarchical control in war-torn areas of limited statehood. In addition, international organizations as well as—mostly Western—states often interfere authoritatively, particularly in modern protectorates such as Kosovo or Afghanistan that have all but lost their “Westphalian sovereignty” (see chapters by Schneckener and Brozus in this volume).
Much more common, however, are nonhierarchical modes of social coordination in areas of limited statehood (Börzel and Risse 2005; Göhler et al. 2009). Nonhierarchical steering involves creating and manipulating incentives and “benchmarking,” as well as initiating communicative learning processes. Positive incentives as well as sanctions are meant to affect the cost-benefit calculations of the relevant parties and to induce the desired behavior. Governance also includes bargaining processes and horizontal negotiation as well as nonmanipulative communication, persuasion, and learning. The latter modes of governance aim at challenging fixed interests and preferences so that actors are induced in a socialization process to internalize new rules and norms. Most chapters in the second part of this book explore the bargaining processes between state and nonstate actors involved in governance in areas of limited statehood.
When Governance Travels: The Implicit (Western) Bias of Social Science Concepts
The understanding of governance employed in this book largely follows the conceptualizations in American and European social sciences. However, applying the governance concept to areas of limited statehood reveals some implicit biases. The way in which the governance concept has been developed in the social sciences (and has become part of political practice) is strongly influenced by the experiences of Western modernity and of modern statehood as defined earlier.
The Distinction Between the “Public” and the “Private” Spheres
Defining governance and the modes of governance in terms of including state and nonstate actors in the provision of collective goods more often than not relies on the distinction between the “public” and “private” realms. This distinction, however, stems from modern statehood in its Western and Eurocentric understandings. This is problematic when we apply the governance concept to other historical contexts or other cultural experiences in the contemporary international system. Historically speaking, the modern Western notion of the “private sphere” is connected to processes of individualization and personalization that only emerged in the second half of eighteenth-century Europe leading to the separation of the public and the private (e.g., Böckenförde 1976; Keane 1988). As Conrad and Stange argue in their chapter, thinking of the “public” and the “private” spheres as binary categories is inherently problematic with regard to colonial rule. They demonstrate, for example, that the differences between state-funded administrative personnel and “private” actors among the colonizers were marginal at best—for example, the “private” East India Company exercised “public” authority on behalf of the British Empire. The same holds true for the definition of indigenous elites as “private” actors, since colonizers often gave local “chiefs” the authority to rule hierarchically.
Applying the public-private distinction to contemporary areas of limited statehood is just as difficult. Of course, we can still distinguish formally between the state and the nonstate sector including for-profit companies, on the one hand, and the nonprofit and civil society sector, on the other. But what does this mean in countries in which state institutions are so weak that government actors can easily exploit state resources for private purposes, while so-called “private” actors such as companies or NGOs provide much-needed collective goods with regard to education, public health, or infrastructure (e.g., Börzel et al. 2007; Fuhr et al. 2007; see chapters by Liese and Beisheim, and Börzel et al. in this volume). In other words, the implicit assumption of the public-private distinction according to which governments govern and private actors mind their own business is often turned on its head in areas of limited statehood. The distinction that comes with Western modernity, according to which “state = public” and “nonstate = private” is enormously problematic in areas of limited statehood.
Take the example of Palestine under Yasser Arafat: The Palestinian Authority was more or less corrupt at the time and the development aid provided by the international community to jump-start the Palestinian state ended up in private coffers. At the same time, the militant Islamist organization of Hamas provided crucial governance services in the social, education, and public health sectors of the Palestinian territories. So, who governed Palestine at the time? If we use the previously stated governance definition, Hamas is Janus-faced: On the one hand, it is a governance actor providing public services in Palestine. On the other hand and almost at the same time, it is a terrorist organization that undermines governance in the security realm. The same held true for the Palestinian Authority under Arafat: Its security agencies at least tried to maintain public security in the occupied territories, while Palestinian “state” actors undermined governance with regard to the provision of other collective goods/
The example of Palestine refers to widespread phenomena in areas of limited statehood: Rent-seeking governments distribute state revenues including development aid to maintain their rule via clientelistic networks (the so-called neopatrimonial state in sub-Saharan Africa, the Southern Caucasus, and elsewhere; see Erdmann 2002; Erdmann and Engel 2007). In other words, they transform public goods into club or even private goods. In a different way, the emergence of “shadow states” has to be considered here too (Koehler and Zürcher 2004; Zürcher 2007). On the one hand, formal state institutions have ceased to exist or to provide governance services in failing and failed states. On the other hand, informal governance institutions often emerge providing social and political order as well as collective goods, thereby preventing the country or the region from completely collapsing into anarchy. In some cases, such as the Southern Caucasus, shadow states survive over extended periods of time.
These examples challenge the way in which the concepts of “state” and “public” as well as “nonstate” and “private” are mostly used interchangeably in the social sciences based on the historical experience of Western modernity. They also show the implicit normative connotations of the distinction (see Ladwig et al. 2007; also chapter by Ladwig and Rudolf in this volume). We usually expect that state actors contribute to governance, that is, that they act in the public rather than the private interest. At least, they are supposed to justify their actions with regard to the common good (see Zürn 2005). While policy-makers might be power-seeking, state institutions in a consolidated state—no matter how “transformed”—are supposed to direct their practices toward governance in the common interest. And if they abuse their power, we can throw them out through democratic procedures or, in the worst case, through the judicial system. Limited statehood, however, consists of weak political institutions lacking the capacity to constrain power-maximizing actors. As a result, it becomes problematic to speak of “public” actors in such cases or to assume that state actors promote the public interest. As to private actors, we usually assume that private companies pursue their egoistic self-interest, even if their businesses practices produce positive externalities for the community (jobs, welfare, etc.). But we also assume that private actors act within the confines of the law—and if not, that the courts will take care of them.
These assumptions that come with the “public-private” distinction are missing in areas of limited statehood. At least, they can no longer be taken for granted. The conceptual problem cannot be solved easily—for example, one could speak of “hybrid” regimes or forms of governance in order to avoid the distinction between the public and private realms or between state and nonstate actors (e.g., Bendel et al. 2002). But such a solution only sidesteps the problem to discern who provides governance services and who does not, and under which conditions. A possible way out would be to investigate empirically who serves as a governance actor—irrespective of a formal position in the political system or in society. In other words, one would search for functional equivalents of “public” actors (Draude 2007, 2008).
Intentionality and Normativity of Governance
These considerations lead to a second problem with regard to the applicability of the governance concept to areas of limited statehood. The governance concept as defined earlier is geared toward producing and implementing collectively binding rules and providing collective goods. In other words, governance implies intentional action toward providing public services for a given community (Mayntz 2004, 67). This does not mean that governance actors have to be necessarily motivated toward the public interest, even though motivations toward the common interest do not hurt. Policy-makers, for example, can still be egoistic power-maximizers. Yet, in a consolidated state, they are usually embedded in governance structures that institutionalize the intentionality of governance toward providing services for the community.
The inherent intentionality of governance becomes problematic when applied to areas of limited statehood. First, as noted earlier, we can no longer assume that governance institutions such as the state or its “shadow of hierarchy” embody intentions toward providing collective goods. Second, we need to distinguish between the provision of some collective goods or services as the unintended consequence of “private” activities, on the one hand, and the explicit regulation of social issues and intentional provision of collective goods, on the other. Only the second understanding would qualify as governance if we stick to the earlier conceptualization.
To illustrate the point with an example: Oil companies such as BP in Angola routinely use private security firms to protect their industrial production facilities in areas of limited statehood. This transforms security into a private good. Protecting such facilities might have positive externalities for the surrounding neighborhoods insofar as the security firms might unintentionally deter armed gangs or militias from attacking nearby villages too. In this sense, the firms while primarily providing a private good for BP would also contribute to public security, albeit indirectly. But we would not call this security governance because of the lack of intentionality. This activity could be called governance only if BP explicitly instructs the security firm to protect not only the oil facilities but also the surrounding villages.
In other cases, we are faced with a continuum ranging from governance in the sense defined here to “racketeering:” The Afghan warlord who uses his militias to provide public security for the area of his rule can be regarded a governance actor. However, the more he uses the same militias to threaten the safety of the community and then resells security to clientelistic networks for a protection fee, the more he would transform public security into a club or private good. The latter would be “racketeering” (Chojnacki and Branovic 2007; Schuppert 2007, 479; see the chapter by Chojnacki and Branovic in this volume).
Thus, applying the governance concept to areas of limited statehood highlights its unavoidable intentionality and implicit normativity. If we define governance—as is common in the social sciences—as the making and implementing of collectively binding rules and the provision of collective goods, we cannot refrain from acknowledging that governance is linked normatively toward what is supposed to be in the common interest. But who are those in areas of limited statehood in whose name the “common interest” is being pronounced? What is the relevant community or collectivity for whom governance is provided? Once again, these issues are clearly decided in the ideal typical modern Western state. In most cases, governance is provided for the people or the citizens living in a given territory. While some services are only accessible to the citizens rather than the residents, even noncitizen residents enjoy some basic rights as well as access to at least some public services.
All this becomes problematic in areas of limited statehood. In many cases, it remains unclear who are the addressees of governance, who is entitled to which governance services, and who actually receives them in practice. We cannot simply assume that the collectivity for which governance is provided is clearly defined. Take border regions in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, that are beyond the control of central governments. Are those entitled to receiving governance the people living on a given territory? Or members of particular tribal or ethnic communities? And who decides who is entitled to what, particularly in cases of extremely scarce resources? Is it governance if collective goods become club goods in the sense that only particular ethnic, religious, or gendered communities are entitled to receive them? The latter constitutes a common practice in many areas of limited statehood, both historically and in the contemporary international system.
Thus, applying governance to areas of limited statehood requires taking a step back and refraining from “either everything or nothing” conceptual solutions. On the one hand, if governance is overburdened with such a strong normative orientation toward the common good or the public interest, we will not find much governance in areas of limited statehood by definition (on this point, see Schuppert 2007). In this case, governance does not travel very far outside the developed OECD world. On the other hand, if we strip the concept of governance of all normative connotations, then everything is governance and the privatization of collective goods has normative weight equal to the provision of public goods.
I suggest something in between as a way out: we should consider governance as both a process and a continuum. The more inclusive the social group for which goods are provided or regulations are formulated, the more we should consider this as governance. After all, this approximates the definition of public goods in terms of nonrivalry in consumption and nonexclusivity in access. In contrast, the more certain services are only provided for exclusive groups and the more collective goods are transformed into club or private goods accessible only to those who pay for them or who belong to specific ethnic or religious groups, the less we should conceptualize this as governance. In particular, applying the notion of collective goods to areas of limited statehood requires a more differentiated conceptualization of the collectivity for which governance is provided. In many cases, those entitled to receiving collective goods such as security are distinct from the addressees of governance services that also differ from those who factually receive governance (see the chapter by Chojnacki and Branovic in this volume; also De la Rosa et al. 2008).
It follows that the borders between governance and “racketeering” are rather fluid in areas of limited statehood. The weaker and the more fragile the state, the less it makes sense to judge governance services according to benchmarks derived from modern developed states. Rather, we should strive for minimum normative standards in these cases (Keohane 2007; Ladwig 2007; also the chapter by Ladwig and Rudolf in this volume).
Governance and the “Shadow of Hierarchy”
A third problem with regard to the application of the governance concept to areas of limited statehood concerns what has been called the “shadow of hierarchy” (Scharpf 1993). Research on modes of governance in the OECD world and on the transformation of (modern) statehood has demonstrated that public-private cooperation (such as PPPs) and private self-regulation are usually most effective under the “shadow of hierarchy.” This means that state agencies supervise private regulatory efforts and that governments threaten to legislate if private actors do not get their act together or do not provide the collective goods. The liberalization of various public services—such as telecommunications, electricity, and the like—has led to ample efforts at reregulation by the modern state (e.g., Héritier 2003; Börzel 2007; 2008). Hierarchical steering or the threat to do so appears to be a precondition for the successful implementation and effectiveness of modes of governance in the modern nation-state and beyond. In other words, nonhierarchical modes of steering and including nonstate actors in governance complement rather than substitute for regulatory activities by national governments or supranational institutions such as the European Union. Moreover—and paradoxically—strong states or strong supranational organizations are required for nonhierarchical modes of steering to be effective and to enhance the problem-solving capacity of governance (Börzel 2009, 2010). Managing political authority requires effective state capacities including a strong “shadow of hierarchy.”
If these findings are universally applicable, then governance in areas of limited statehood is doomed. Areas of limited statehood are by definition characterized by weak state capacities to implement and enforce decisions, that is, by weak “shadows of hierarchy.” Moreover, the contribution of nonstate actors to the provision of collective goods has to substitute for governance by governments rather than to complement it. If the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) decides to withdraw from providing services in the area of public health—for example, the immunization of children—in sub-Saharan Africa, these services will not be provided at all (for details see Schäferhoff, in preparation; Beisheim et al. 2008; and the chapter by Liese and Beisheim in this volume). If Daimler and other automobile manufacturers in South Africa were to withdraw from fighting HIV/AIDS at their production facilities and the surrounding areas, the fight there against the pandemic would be doomed (Börzel, Héritier, and Müller-Debus 2007; Müller-Debus et al. 2009). The same holds true for environmental protection in South Africa, as the chapter by Börzel et al. reveals. In each of these examples, the central governments are far too weak to provide the collective goods in question. As a result, private actors and the international community substitute for rather than complement governance by the state.
What explains then that we actually find governance in areas of limited statehood? The chapters in this volume suggest that there might be functional equivalents to the “shadow of hierarchy” provided by consolidated statehood (see Börzel 2010). First, in the case of the modern protectorates, the international community not only rules authoritatively in areas of limited statehood and interferes with a country’s “Westphalian sovereignty,” but it also provides a “shadow of hierarchy” (chapters by Schneckener and Brozus in this volume; see also Lake 2009 on hierarchy in the international order). Second, international legal standards on good governance, human rights, and the rule of law hold actors accountable in areas of limited statehood, be it governments, NGOs, firms, or even rebel groups (see chapter by Ladwig and Rudolf in this volume). While enforcement of these standards is inherently problematic, the increased legalization of these standards including the international “responsibility to protect” (R2P) casts a shadow of hierarchy in areas of limited statehood. Last but not least, there are various incentive structures available to commit nonstate actors to the provision of collective goods even under the most dire circumstances of limited statehood. As Chojnacki and Branovic argue in their chapter, even warlords, local “big men,” or rebel groups sometimes provide security as a collective good in security markets if faced with an opportunity structure by which they benefit from protecting the local population rather than exploiting it. As to firms and environmental protection in South Africa, Börzel et al. show that there are several market-based mechanisms inducing companies to engage in self-regulation. If, for example, brand-name firms target high-end markets or are subjected to NGO campaigns, they are likely to provide collective goods in the framework of corporate social responsibility (CSR).
In sum, this overview suggests that there are some implicit biases in the governance concept as it has been developed in the context of Western-based social sciences and modern statehood. However, one should not throw out the baby with the bathwater. The governance concept provides a useful tool to analyze policies and politics in areas of limited statehood, precisely because it directs our attention to the role of nonstate actors, on the one hand, and nonhierarchical modes of steering, on the other. As a result, governance overcomes the state-centric bias implicit in the literature on failed and failing states as well as the modernization bias of most development studies. State-building in areas of limited statehood might be futile, but “governance-shaping” certainly is not, as Brozus argues in his chapter.
I now turn to the contributions in this book in more detail to explore the role of nonstate actors in the provision of governance, on the one hand, and the contribution of the international community to governance in areas of limited statehood, on the other.
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